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MAURINE STEVENSON, as personal representative of LaMar Stevenson 
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* United Underwriters accepted First Colony's tender of defense rendering 
the third-party complaint unnecessary. 
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (the "Opinion") 
was issued on March 3,1992. It was published at 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 
(Utah App. 1992). The opinion was filed March 3, 1992. The court of 
appeals Case No. is 910561-CA. The opinion was authored by Norman H. 
Jackson, Appellate Court Judge, and concurred in by the two other judges 
on the panel, Judith M. Billings and Leonard H. Russon. A copy is attached 
as Appendix 1. 
On March 17, 1992, appellee First Colony filed a petition for 
rehearing. On April 17, 1992, pursuant to request from the Court of 
Appeals, appellant filed a response to the petition for rehearing. 
On May 22, the court of appeals entered its order denying the 
petition for rehearing. A copy is attached as Appendix 2. 
JURISDICTION 
A. On March 3, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals decision was 
filed. 
B. No orders concerning extensions of time within which to 
petition for certiorari have been requested or made. 
C. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (a) and (5) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In May of 1986, LaMar Stevenson, having been delinquent on 
several premiums due on a life insurance policy with Chubb Life 
American, was cancelled by Chubb. Stevenson then sought new life 
insurance coverage on himself through Roger Fleiss, and Talbert 
Corporation, Fleiss's employer. Talbert Corporation and Fleiss 
recommended to Stevenson that he seek life insurance through First Colony 
Life Insurance Company. Opinion at 2. 
Stevenson filled out and signed an application provided by Talbert 
Corporation through Fleiss for life insurance with First Colony in June, 
1986. The application was signed by Stevenson as the proposed insured, by 
Roger Fleiss as witness, and by Norman Close of the Denver office of 
Talbert Corporation as licensed registered agent. Stevenson tendered a 
check, dated July 7, 1986, in the amount of $410.00, payable to First 
Colony. This check represented the first semiannual premium payment for 
a $500,000 life insurance policy. A conditional receipt was issued to 
Stevenson by First Colony which set forth the conditions under which 
conditional coverage would become effective prior to policy delivery. The 
receipt was dated July 7, 1986, and bears the signature of Norman Close. 
First Colony negotiated Stevenson's premium check shortly thereafter. 
Opinion at 2. All parties agree that the life insurance policy became 
effective at that time. 
In August of 1986, Maurine Stevenson, LaMar's wife, contacted the 
Salt Lake office of Talbert Corporation to ask why her husband had not 
received a policy from First Colony. The record indicates that she spoke 
to an unidentified person in the office, who informed her that First Colony 
was not going to insure LaMar, because one of his companies was in 
bankruptcy. Neither Stevenson nor his wife received notice of declination 
from First Colony. The parties do not dispute that First Colony did not 
notify either of the Stevensons personally or by any form of written notice. 
Nothing in the record indicates First Colony sent written notice to Talbert 
Corporation, and the record is unclear as to how someone at Talbert 
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Corporation became aware that First Colony had declined Stevenson's 
application. Opinion at 2. 
Stevenson sought life insurance coverage with Bankers Life 
Company in early October 1986. After he completed the necessary 
information on the application, he gave the application to Norman Close, 
who disclosed on the application that Stevenson had been declined coverage 
by First Colony. Norman Close never discussed this addition to the 
application with the Stevensons. LaMar Stevenson was killed in an accident 
on October 18, 1986. At the time of his death, neither United 
Underwriters nor First Colony had returned the premium of $410.00 paid 
by Stevenson. The premium payment was not tendered to Maurine 
Stevenson until December, 1986. Opinion at 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Maurine Stevenson, filed this action against defendants 
First Colony, Roger Fleiss, and Talbert Corporation, claiming that a valid 
contract of insurance existed at the time of her husband's death, since no 
notice of rejection of the life insurance application was given by First 
Colony and the premium payment was not returned until months after 
Stevenson's death. 
On October 19, 1989, First Colony filed a motion for summary 
judgment, contending that the temporary contract of insurance created by 
the conditional receipt terminated with First Colony's rejection of 
Stevenson's insurance application and oral notification to the Stevensons, 
through Fleiss or Talbert Corporation. Maurine Stevenson countered with 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that a valid contract of insurance 
remained in force as a result of the failure of First Colony to give notice of 
rejection and to return the premium. 
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The trial court granted Maurine Stevenson's motion for summary 
judgment and denied First Colony's motion. The trial court entered 
judgment in the amount of $500,000 for Maurine Stevenson. On March 2, 
1990, the trial court vacated its earlier order and entered judgment for 
Maurine Stevenson in the amount of $300,00, based on the terms of the 
conditional receipt. 
Both parties appealed. Maurine Stevenson appealed the trial court's 
determination that the amount of the policy which became effective upon 
issuance of the conditional receipt was $300,000, arguing that judgment 
should be for $500,000, the face amount of the application. 
First Colony appealed the trial court's determination that life 
insurance coverage was in effect at the time of the Stevenson's death. 
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, that the 
amount of temporary insurance in effect at the time of Stevenson's death 
was $300,00, the amount printed on the conditional receipt, and not 
$500,000, the amount requested in the application. 
The Court of Appeals also held that notice must be clearly and 
unequivocally communicated to the applicant in an unambiguous manner, 
and that First Colony did not effectively dispatch notice to Stevenson that 
his temporary insurance was terminated. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED 
CERTIORARI SINCE THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT DEPART 
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS . 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1991) governs the 
consideration for Review by Writ of Certiorari. Review by Writ of 
Certiorari is not a matter of right. Rule 46 (c) discusses those decisions 
rendered by the Court of Appeals that depart from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings. The defendant relies solely on Rule 46 (c) 
in its attempt to obtain a Writ of Certiorari. See Defendant's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, p. 2. Rule 46 (c) requires a showing that "a panel of 
the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of 
the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Although the defendant states 
that the court of appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the excepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision, the record is devoid 
of any issue which might depart from the usual course of judicial 
proceedings. In fact, the Defendant's brief is a desperate attempt to 
get this Court to revisit the factual issues of this case for the third time. 
First Colony's brief argues that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the 
facts, and failed to view them from the record in the light most favorable 
to First Colony. Plaintiffs submit that the Court of Appeals did not 
misapprehend the facts, nor did they fail to view them in the light most 
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favorable to First Colony. Contrary to defendant's present contentions, the 
Appellate Court adopted the legal arguments and factual background 
forwarded by the defendant. 
In reaching its ruling, the Court of Appeals cited in a footnote 
sections of the Utah Insurance Code, as instructional to the issue of how 
insurance policies, other than temporary life insurance, may be cancelled. 
"...[C]ancellation of insurance is effective only after the delivery of a first 
class mailing of a written notice to the policy holder." Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-21-303 (1) (a). However, the Court did not adopt the plaintiffs 
argument that written notice should be required in all cases. Instead, the 
court adopted the defendants position that "adequate notice" is all that is 
required. The Court of Appeals relied upon Ouindlen v. Prudential Ins. 
Co.. 482 F. 2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of application requires 
communication from company to applicant, as whole purpose of 
prepayment receipt is to assure an applicant that he is insured until 
company acts ~ not that he is insured if the company acts); Northern Ins. 
Co. v. Mabrv. 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P. 2d 347, 349 (1966) ("[t]hough 
mutual consent to cancel may be expressed or implied from the 
circumstances . . .such presupposes some communication from the insured 
to the mind of the insurer."); Transamerican Ins. Co. v. Bank of Mantee. 
241 So. 2d 822, 825 (Miss. 1970) (cancellation must be definite, clear and 
unequivocal); Colorado Life Co. v. Teaque. 117 S.W. 2d 849, 856 (Tx. 
Civ. App. 1938) ("[i]nsurer cannot terminate the risk so assumed otherwise 
than by notice brought home to the insured in his lifetime that his 
application was rejected."). 
The plaintiff argued to the Court of Appeals that adequate notice of 
rejection requires written notice and the return of premium. The Court of 
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Appeals disagreed with that position and agreed with defendant that Utah 
law establishes that a contract of temporary insurance is effectively 
terminated when notice is clearly and unequivocally communicated to the 
applicant in an unambiguous manner, (Opinion at 8). However, the court 
found that clear and unambiguous notice was not given. In addition, the 
court held that no effective date of termination of the temporary insurance 
was given and there was no indication when the premium payment would 
be returned.(Opinion at 8). In so ruling, the Appellate Court did not 
depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 
The undisputed fact in this case is that the defendant First Colony 
never notified either of the Stevensons personally, nor by any form of 
written notice, that they intended to decline coverage on LaMar Stevenson. 
(Opinion at 2) Since there was no written or verbal communication by the 
defendant First Colony, it rests its "clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous" 
notice argument on an undocumented phone conversation between Mrs. 
Stevenson (not the insured) and "long time agent" Fleiss, of Talbert 
Corporation in Salt Lake. In a response to a deposition question about 
whether she understood, after a phone conversation with Mr. Fleiss, that 
"First Colony wouldn't cover you", she responded, "probably". See 
deposition of Maurine Stevenson at 105, attached hereto as Appendix 3. 
On three occasions in his deposition, agent Fleiss denies ever talking to 
either of the Stevensons about any First Colony rejection, and stated, 
(Fleiss deposition, pages 55, 69, 104) "That would have been handled in 
Denver. "(Fleiss deposition at 69). See deposition of Roger Fleiss, pages 
55, 69, and 104, attached hereto as Appendix 4. 
The Appellate Court acknowledged the conversation, but found that 
such a phone call was not adequate notice. "In addition, there is no 
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evidence in the record concerning the contents of the communication. No 
effective date of termination of the temporary insurance was given and 
there was no indication when the premium payment would be returned." 
(Opinion page 8.) 
The defendant argues that there was a clear intent to return the 
premium even though no document in writing and no conversation with the 
Stevensons is found until almost two months after Mr. Stevenson's death. 
In its Petition for Writ Of Certiorari, the defendant argues that there was 
an intent evidenced to return the premium. See defendant's Petition, page 
7. What the defendant does not say in its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
is that this clear intent to return the premium was in fact a hearsay note, 
never seen by either LaMar or Maurine Stevenson, dated September 29, 
1986, 48 days after the alleged clear and unambiguous notice of 
declination. Cindy at United Underwriters included this note as part of a 
document prepared on November 21, 1986, more than a month after the 
death of LaMar Stevenson. See November 21 document, attached hereto as 
Appendix 5. It is undisputed that there was never a written notice or 
attempt to return the premium (due to a "slight oversight," defendant's 
Petition, page 7) until almost two months after Mr. Stevenson's death. 
Two different courts have found that these dubious facts do not impart the 
requisite clear and unequivocal notice and intent to return the premium 
required by law. 
Finally, the defendant argues that the Bankers Life application is 
proof that LaMar Stevenson had clear notice of the declination of the First 
Colony policy for two reasons: 1) he marked "yes" in the space after 
question No. 30, "Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, 
declined, modified or cancelled?" , and 2) because he signed the application 
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with a note filled in at number 30, regarding his business filing chapter 11 
bankruptcy. Of course LaMar Stevenson would have answered "yes" to 
Number 30. His Chubb policy had just been cancelled for non payment of 
premium. After Stevenson completed the application, he gave the 
application to Norman Close, who only then added the comment to the 
application, disclosing that Stevenson had been declined Coverage by First 
Colony. Norman Close never discussed with the Stevensons what he had 
made additions to the application. Opinion at 3. See, also, Bankers Life 
application, attached hereto as Appendix 6. 
The Appellate Court ruled that there was "no effective date of 
termination" given, and the fact is, there was not. Still, First Colony 
requests that this Court revisit these same issues for the third time. 
Defendant argues that the two lower courts have so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that this Court's 
supervision is required. The plaintiff believes that the decision is well 
within the mainstream of current Utah judicial thought as evidenced by the 
cases which the Appellate Court cites. 
When the Supreme Court has ruled on an issue and the Appellate 
Court is faithful in following the Court's decision, the Appellate Court 
cannot be said to have departed from the accepted norm. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant states no persuasive reason for granting a Writ of 
Certiorari. Along with a long settled question of law, in absence of 
conflicting court decisions, or a total misapprehension of the facts before 
it, the plaintiffs believe that Supreme Court consideration of these issues is 
unnecessary. Defendant's denials, delays and appeals have denied Maurine 
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Stevenson justice for more than five years. Defendant's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this C M day of July, 1992. 
ALLEN IWOUNG 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Objection to Appellee's Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Utah was sent by U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid, 
this 2 3 day of July, 1992, to: 
Denton M. Hatch, Esq. 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D. Gary Christian, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Talbert Corporation and 
Roger Fleiss 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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MAR 31992 
Maurine Stevenson, as personal 
representative of LaMar 
Stevenson, and as trustee of 
LaMar D. Stevenson Trust, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
First Colony Life Insurance 
Company: Talbert Corporation; 
and Roger Fleiss, 
Defendants, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No- 910561-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 3 , 1992) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
Attorneys: Allen K. Young and Douglas A. Baxter, Springville, 
for Appellant 
Denton M. Hatch and Roger R. Fairbanks, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
In May of 1986, LaMar Stevenson, having been delinquent on 
several premiums due on a life insurance policy with Chubb Life 
American, was cancelled by Chubb. Stevenson then sought new life 
insurance coverage on himself through Roger Fleiss, an insurance 
salesman, and Talbert Corporation,1 Fleiss7s employer at all 
1. Talbert Corporation has offices in Salt Lake City, Utah and 
Denver, Colorado. Roger Fleiss was affiliated with the Salt Lake 
City office at all times relevant to.this case, and Norman Close 
was affiliated with the Denver office. "Talbert Corporation," 
for purposes of this opinion, refers to the corporation, and no 
particular office, unless otherwise designated. 
times relevant to this case. Talbert Corporation and Fleiss 
recommended to Stevenson that he seek life insurance through 
First Colony Life Insurance Company. 
Stevenson filled out and signed an application provided b 
Talbert Corporation through Fleiss for life insurance with Fir 
Colony in June 1986. The application was signed by Stevenson 
the proposed insured, by Roger Fleiss as witness,, and by Norma 
Close of the Denver office of Talbert Corporation as licensed 
registered agent. Someone wrote on the original application t 
it was for $1,000,000 coverage. That figure was crossed out a 
$500,000 written in its place. All parties agree that Stevens 
applied for $500,000 in the life insurance application. 
Stevenson tendered a check payable to First Colony in the amou 
of $410 shortly after the application was completed. The chec 
was dated July 7, 1986 and represented the first semiannual 
premium payment. A conditional receipt was issued to Stevensc 
by First Colony which set forth the conditions under which 
conditional coverage would become effective prior to policy 
delivery. The conditional receipt was referred to in two 
separate paragraphs on the application, and was attached to tt 
application as the last page. The receipt was dated July 7, 
1986, and bears only the signature of Norman Close. The 
conditional receipt further stated that the total amount of li 
insurance which may become effective prior to policy delivery 
could not exceed $300,000. First Colony introduced evidence 
which indicated that Stevenson was aware the conditional polic 
was for $3 00,000, and that he further agreed in a telephone 
conversation with a First Colony representative to lower the 
amount of coverage provided in the conditional receipt to 
$250,000. First Colony negotiated Stevenson's premium check 
shortly thereafter. 
In August 1986, Stevenson's wife, Maurine Stevenson, 
contacted the Salt Lake office of Talbert Corporation to ask \ 
her husband had not received a policy from First Colony. The 
record indicates that she spoke with an unidentified person ii 
that office, who informed her that First Colony was not going 
insure Stevenson. The reason given to her was that one of 
Stevenson7s companies was in bankruptcy. Neither Stevenson n< 
his wife received notice of declination from First Colony. TJ 
parties do not dispute that First Colony did not notify eithe: 
the Stevensons personally or by any form of written notice, 
addition, nothing in the record indicates First Colony sent 
written notice to Talbert Corporation, and the record is uncL 
as to how someone at Talbert Corporation became aware that Fl 
Colony had declined Stevenson's application. 
Stevenson sought life insurance coverage with Bankers Li 
Company in early October 1986. After Stevenson completed the 
necessary information on the application, he gave the applica 
to Norman Close, who added a comment to the application, 
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disclosing that Stevenson had been declined coverage by First 
Colony. Norman Close never discussed with the Stevensons what he 
had added to the application. Stevenson was killed in an 
accident on October 18, 1986. At the time of his death, neither 
United Underwriters nor First Colony had returned the premium of 
$410 paid by Stevenson. The premium payment was not tendered to 
Maurine Stevenson until December 1986. 
The plaintiff, Maurine Stevenson, filed this action against 
defendants First Colony, Roger Fleiss, and Talbert Corporation, 
claiming, among other things, that a valid contract of insurance 
existed at the time of her husband's death. This contention was 
based upon the fact that no written notice of rejection of the 
life insurance application was given by First Colony and the 
premium payment was not returned until months after Stevenson's 
death. The original complaint stated the life insurance in 
effect at the time of Stevenson's death was for $250,000. The 
complaint was amended to reflect an amount of $500,000. 
On October 19, 1989, First Colony filed a motion for summary 
judgment, contending that the temporary contract of insurance 
created by the conditional receipt terminated with First Colony's 
rejection of Stevenson's insurance application and oral 
notification to the Stevensons, through Fleiss or Talbert 
Corporation. Maurine Stevenson countered with a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that a valid contract of insurance 
remained in force as a result of the failure of First Colony to 
give notice of rejection and to return the premium. 
After considering the motions for summary judgment without 
oral argument, the trial court granted Maurine Stevenson's motion 
for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion. The trial 
court then entered judgment in the amount of $500,000 for Maurine 
Stevenson. On March 2, 1990, after oral argument on the amount 
of the judgment, the trial court vacated its earlier order and 
entered judgment for Maurine Stevenson in the amount of $300,000, 
based on only the terms of the conditional receipt, and not the 
face amount of the application. We affirm. 
ISSUES 
Both parties appeal. Maurine Stevenson appeals the trial 
court's determination that the amount of the policy which became 
effective upon issuance of the conditional receipt was $3 00,000. 
In arguing that judgment should be for $500,000, she claims there 
was a reasonable expectation of full and immediate coverage in 
the amount of $500,000; that the conditional receipt cannot be 
construed to limit the amount of that liability; that the policy 
must be considered together with the receipt; that if an 
ambiguity exists, it should be resolved in favor of the insured; 
that a handwritten provision prevails over a printed limitation; 
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and that this court should impose full liability on First Colon 
in view of First Colony's delay in notifying the Stevensons of 
rejection and in returning the premium paid by the Stevensons. 
First Colony appeals the trial court's determination that 
life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of Stevenson' 
death. Specifically, First Colony challenges the trial court's 
determination that First Colony did not effectively terminate t 
temporary insurance contract; that the Stevensons did not recei 
adequate notice that First Colony had rejected Stevenson's 
application for life insurance; and that written notice and 
return of premium payment was required to terminate the tempore 
insurance contract. In the alternativef First Colony claims tl 
if its life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of 
Stevenson's death, the judgment should have been for $250,000. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court has recently articulated its settled standard < 
review for summary judgement: "Summary judgment can be grante< 
when no genuine issue of material fact existsf and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Silcox v. 
Skaggs Aloha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623, 623 (Utah App* 1991) 
(citations omitted). "Inasmuch as a challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, because, 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, t 
Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.'* 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted). As for the trial court's determination on the amoun 
of damages, the trial court interpreted the insurance contract 
a matter of law and therefore we review its construction under 
correctness standard. See Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 
645, 647 (Utah App. 1987). 
While we would normally address those issues raised in th 
direct appeal first and then address the cross-appeal issues, 
this case we first address cross-appellant First Colony's 
challenge to the summary judgment. If we find that summary 
judgment was improperly granted, we need not reach the other 
issues raised by either party. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MAURINE STEVENSON 
First Colony alleges that Maurine Stevenson's own admiss: 
during discovery establish that First Colony declined to insm 
her husband, that the Stevensons were aware of the declinatioi 
and that First Colony therefore unconditionally terminated tin 
temporary contract of insurance prior to Stevenson's death. ' 
trial court disagreed, finding that "because there was not 
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adequate notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance had been 
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the 
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr. 
Stevenson's death.11 Therefore, we must determine whether the 
notice to Talbert Corporation that Stevenson's application for 
life insurance had been declined by First Colony was adequate 
notice to Stevenson to terminate the temporary contract of 
insurance, and whether return of the premium by First Colony to 
Stevenson was a condition precedent to unilateral termination.2 
The trial court explicitly relied upon Smith v. Westland 
Life Ins, Co.. 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), in reaching its decision 
that the policy was in effect at the time of Stevenson's death. 
In that case, the supreme court of California held that when an 
insurer has received an application for life insurance together 
with payment of the first premium, a provisional contract 
granting temporary insurance is created. That contract is not 
terminated, according to the California court, until the insurer 
has nullified the two factors that gave rise to the applicant's 
expectation that he or she was covered: "his signing of the 
application and his payment of the premium." Id. at 442. 
In Smith, the applicant signed an application for life 
insurance and tendered the first month's premium. The insurance 
agent provided the applicant with a conditional receipt, similar 
to the receipt issued in the case at bar. After the insurance 
company processed the application, the agent delivered to the 
applicant a policy which modified some of the terms originally 
agreed upon. The applicant refused to accept or sign the 
modified policy. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade 
the applicant to accept the policy as modified, the agent told 
the applicant his premium would be refunded. The following day 
the applicant died. The issue on appeal was whether, prior to 
the applicant's death, the insurance company effectuated a 
termination of the temporary insurance. 
The court found that the applicant had not received written 
notice of termination of his temporary insurance and "[o]ral 
communications between Smith and Westland's agents were generally 
shrouded in terms of his acceptance of a policy with minor 
modifications." Id. at 444. Further, the applicant never 
received a refund of his premium before his fatal accident. The 
2. Both First Colony and Maurine Stevenson attempt to frame the 
issue in this case as one of "is written notice required?" 
However, the trial court, while stating the issue as "whether 
written notice and return of the premium is required to terminate 
a temporary life insurance contract," held that "because there 
was not adequate notice . . . and because the premium was not 
returned timely, the contract was in full force and effect at the 
time of Mr. Stevenson's death." 
5 
court's rationale rested upon the principle of effectuating tl 
expectations of the ordinary applicant. Id. at 441. The cou] 
concluded that an insurer does not terminate temporary covera< 
until ff(a) the insurer has actually rejected the application < 
by appropriate notice communicated such rejection to the insu: 
and (b) refunded the premium payment to the insured." Id* at 
440. The trial court in the instant case quoted this language 
from Smith and held that the First Colony temporary insurance 
contract had not been terminated. 
Relying on Winger v. Gem State Mut.. 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 
P.2d 982 (1969) and Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co,, 29 , 
2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973), First Colony argues that it 
effectively terminated its obligations under the temporary li 
insurance contract by rejection of the application and notice 
the rejection to Talbert Corporation. In Winger, the insuran 
company which had issued conditional life insurance coverage 
an applicant determined that the applicant was not insurable. 
The company sent written notice of rejection to its agent wit 
instructions to notify the applicant that his application had 
been declined. The applicant died before the insurance compa 
agent was able to contact him. The court held no contract of 
insurance existed at the time of death because the insurance 
company "acted with reasonable dispatch in attempting to 
communicate to [the applicant] its action declining his 
application." Winger, 449 P.2d at 983. In Long, the Utah 
Supreme Court first determined that a conditional receipt 
"created temporary insurance coverage until such time as the 
insurers had considered the application and determined to iss 
policy or reject the risk." Long, 507 P.2d at 379. The Lone 
court further held that "the insurer cannot terminate the ris 
assumed unless the insured is notified during his lifetime ti-
the application was rejected." Id. 
We agree with First Colony that Utah law establishes the 
contract of temporary insurance is effectively terminated wh€ 
the application is rejected and the applicant is given adequ* 
notice of that rejection.3 However, none of the cases cited 
First Colony reach the issue of what is "adequate notice." : 
3. See also Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co,. 19 Utah 
174, 428 P.2d 163, 167 (1967) (no notice of rejection to insi 
and no return of premium meant policy in effect at time of 
death). The Smith case, relied upon by the trial court, als< 
articulated this general rule: "the most frequently stated : 
appears to be that a temporary contract of insurance is 
terminated by rejection of the application and notice thereo 
the insured," 539 P.2d at 439 (citing 9 Couch on Insurance, 
§ 39:207, at 653 (2d ed. 1962)). 
6 
Williams v. First Colony Life Ins, Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
1979). The trial court did not find the insurance contract to be 
ambiguous and neither do we.5 See id. (supreme court finds 
similar contract to be unambiguous). 
We agree with the trial court, that as a matter of law the 
amount of temporary insurance in effect at the time of 
Stevenson,s death was $300,000, the amount printed on the 
conditional receipt, and not $500,000, the amount requested in 
the application. 
5. First Colony argues that the trial court failed to take into 
consideration factual evidence which indicated that the amount of 
insurance created by the issuance of the conditional receipt was 
limited to $250,000. The evidence upon which First Colony relies 
is contained in two affidavits. The affidavit of Leonard 
Reynolds, Executive Vice President of United Underwriters states 
that it is the standard practice of the insurance industry not to 
issue a conditional receipt for an amount exceeding $250,000. An 
exhibit attached to the affidavit of Loretta Stacey, an employee 
of First Colony, indicates that United Underwriters advised 
Talbert Corporation that coverage could not exceed $250,000, and 
that Stevenson agreed to drop the amount of conditional coverage 
to $250,000. This exhibit, a memo to the file of Stevenson, was 
prepared on May 5, 1987, seven months after Stevenson died, and 
eleven months after the insurance policy application had been 
completed. Nowhere else in the record is there any evidence 
supporting these contentions. No evidence has been produced 
which indicates who spoke with Stevenson regarding any aspect of 
the conditional receipt, let alone the limitation on the amount 
of coverage. 
When the trial court determined that the written documents 
were clear and unambiguous regarding the amount of coverage then 
in force, it did not need to consider evidence which was 
extrinsic to the writings. First Colony argues that the $300,000 
limitation of the conditional receipt.is clear and unambiguous 
and we agree. Because we agree with First Colony7s contention on 
this point, we are not persuaded by their argument that this 
written limitation of $300,000 was orally modified by a phone 
call that allegedly took place between an unknown representative 
of United Underwriters or Talbert Corporation and Stevenson. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
Maurine Stevenson, and the judgment for $300,000. 
Nonifan H. Jacksoq^Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
$6 &1' SU&itfrU 
wudith M. Billings^ Judged 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
10 
Tab 2 
the absence of express contractual or statutory provisions/ we 
must identify what constitutes adequate notice to terminate a 
temporary life insurance contract. 
"From the standpoint of content, all that is required of a 
notice of cancellation is that it be sufficiently specific to 
manifest an intent to cancel, and to identify the policy in 
question." 17 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 67:138 at 599 (rev. ed. 
1985); see also Ouindlen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 876, 
879 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of application requires 
communication from company to applicant, as whole purpose of 
prepayment receipt is to assure an applicant that he is insured 
until company acts—not that he is insured if, the company acts) ; 
Northern Ins. Co. v. Mabrv, 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P.2d 347, 349 
(1966) ("[t]hough mutual consent to cancel may be expressed or 
implied from the circumstances . . . such presupposes some 
communication from the insured to the mind of the insurer."); 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bank of Mantee, 241 So. 2d 822, 825 
(Miss. 1970) (cancellation must be definite, clear and 
unequivocal); Colorado Life Co. v. Teaque. 117 S.W.2d 849, 856 
(Tx. Civ. App. 1938) ("[i]nsurer cannot terminate the risk so 
assumed otherwise than by notice brought home to the insured in 
his lifetime that his application was rejected."). See generally 
45 C.J.S., Insurance. § 450 p. 86 (1946) (in absence of 
contractual or statutory provision as to form of notice, all that 
is required is that notice is definite and unequivocally shows 
4. Various sections of the Utah Insurance Code, for example, are 
instructional in determining how insurance policies other than 
temporary life insurance contracts may be cancelled by the 
insurer or the insured. Termination of many insurance policies 
is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-3 03 (Supp. 1991) . That 
section provides that cancellation is effective only after the 
delivery or first class mailing of a written notice to the policy 
holder. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(2)(b) (Supp. 1991) 
(explicitly excluding applicability to life and disability 
insurance, see, e.g., § 31A-21-303(1) (a) ) . 
Similarly, under § 31A-22-423 (1991), the section that deals 
with examination periods for life insurance policies, the policy 
owner may return the policy within ten days after its delivery. 
"Return" is explicitly defined in that section to mean "delivery 
to the insurer or its agent, or mailing the policy to either, 
properly addressed and stamped for first class handling, with a 
written statement on the policy or an accompanying writing that 
it is being returned for termination 9f coverage• See also 
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Actual Receipt of Cancellation 
Notice Mailed bv Insurer as Prerequisite to Cancellation of 
Insurance. 40 A.L.R. 4th 867, 876-77 (1985) (overview of methods 
by which insurance policies can be effectively cancelled). 
7 
cancellation will take effect at the expiration of prescribed 
period)• 
The above cited sources reveal that a declination or 
cancellation notice must be communicated clearly enough to th< 
insured or applicant so that he or she understands that the 
insurance coverage is no longer effective. To be sufficient, 
notice must be definite and certain, and leave no doubt in th< 
mind of the recipient that the rejection of insurance is 
effective upon receipt of the notice. The only evidence Firs 
Colony puts forth concerning the manner of communicating 
declination is Maurine Stevenson's deposition and her respons 
to interrogatories. This evidence reveals only that someone 
Talbert Corporation informed Maurine Stevenson orally over th 
telephone that First Colony had declined the application. Th 
phone call was initiated by Maurine Stevenson, who was concer 
that her husband had not received the policy. Neither of the 
Stevensons ever spoke directly to anyone from First Colony. 
First Colony does not claim to know who from their office mad 
the communication, or to whom at Talbert Corporation it was m 
We disagree with First Colony's contention that a phone call 
by an unidentified agent of First Colony, to an unidentified 
person other than Stevenson, the applicant, which allegedly 
communicated First Colony's decision to decline Stevenson's 
application, was adequate notice. In addition, there is no 
evidence in the record concerning the contents of the 
communication. No effective date of termination of the tempo 
insurance was given and there was no indication when the preic 
payment would be returned. 
In sum, we hold that notice must be clearly and 
unequivocally communicated to the applicant in an unambiguous 
manner. In the case before us, we cannot say that First Cole 
effectively dispatched notice to Stevenson that his temporary 
insurance was terminated. 
AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT 
Both parties have claimed error in the amount of damages 
awarded to Maurine Stevenson. Maurine Stevenson appeals the 
trial court's entry of judgment for $3 00,000, claiming it was 
low; First Colony appeals, claiming the amount was too high. 
Maurine Stevenson urges us to hold as a matter of law tl 
the life insurance application and conditional receipt are 
ambiguous, and that any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms 
should be construed in favor of the insured. While this is 1 
it is also true that in determining the intent of this contr< 
we examine the language of the contract itself first, Mand ui 
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no justifies 
for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol evidence." 
A 
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Maurine Stevenson, as personal 
representative of LaMar 
Stevenson, and as trustee of 
LaMar D. Stevenson Trust, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
First Colony Life Insurance 
Company; Talbert Corporation; 
and Roger Fleiss, 
Defendants, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant. 
MAY 211992 
m 2 2 195 
r. Nocnan 
ORDER DENYING' ^  ^ court 
PETITION FOR R E K £ A £ ^ A p p e a U 
Case No. 910561-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellee and 
cross-appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed March 17, 
1992, and appellant and cross-appellee's Response to 
Petition for Rehearing, filed April 17, 1992, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellee and 
cross-appellant's Petition for Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ncfrgan H. J ackson .^audge 
i t h M. B i l l i n g s , J u d g e d 
I DISSENT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby, certify that onrthe 21st day of May, 1992, a. true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed belows 
Allen K. Young 
Douglas A. Baxter 
Young & Kester 
Attorneys at Law 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Denton M. Hatch 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C, 
Attorneys at Law 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
D. Gary Christian 
Kipp & Christian, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 21st day of May, 1992. 
By ^[}r//y )&/?/#/&, 
Deputy7 C^erk 
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Q You may or may not have received it, but you don't 
recall it? 
A That's correct* 
Q It was your understanding, I believe you said, that 
when you wrote the check, Exhibit 17, you understood that you 
had coverage with First Colony? 
A Yeah. 
Q But you understood tha t t ha t exis ted up t o , I think 
you said e a r l i e r , a c e r t a i n po in t t ha t you had d iscussed , and 
I assume you meant by tha t statement when you were no t i f i ed by 
Roger F l e i s s t ha t F i r s t Colony wouldn't cover you? 
A Tha t ' s co r rec t* 
Q From the po in t t h a t Roger F l e i s s no t i f i ed you or 
United Underwri ters , whichever i t was f i r s t , you understood 
tha t you d i d n ' t have coverage with F i r s t Colony L i fe ; is tha t 
co r r ec t ? 
A Probably. 
Q When you wrote the premium and you gave i t to Roger 
or Talber t Corporat ion, and when they s t a r t ed to look for 
another pol icy for you, i t was your understanding, wasn ' t i t , 
tha t you would not rece ive the premium back — 
A Yes. 
Q — the refund back? 
A That's correct. 
Q You knew that First Colony had denied your 
Tab 4 
Q What is your independent recollection of it, do 
you have any? 
A Yes. It was they were not getting it back 
apparently in a timely fashion. We had to continually 
follow up. That is, Denver had to continually follow upv 
with the agency which we dealt through for First Colony to 
get the money back. 
Q Do you know how many times they followed up? 
A The file would indicate that. 
Q Do you have any independent recollection of 
anything you did in relation to that, any — 
A Nothing. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Let him finish his question, 
Roger. 
Q Did you have any conversations with Mrs. 
Stevenson — 
A Restate the question. 
Q — that you recall? Sure. Did you have any 
independent conversations with Mrs. Stevenson about getting 
that money back? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any conversations about why or why 
not? Did you ever advise Mrs. Stevenson that First Colony 
had rejected them? 
A No. 
Computerized Transcript 
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that means? 
A Well, I can't really tell from the way it's 
written. It looks like E-L-L, but I don't know. 
Q Would that stand for something in insurance 
company terms? 
A No. Not that I'm aware of anyway. 
Q Were you ever advised that the insurance with 
First Colony — "you" meaning you, Roger Fleiss, ever 
advised that the lifeinsurance policy with First Colony was 
declined because of the financial info? 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Ever? From the time it was 
applied for until today? 
Q (by Mr. Young) No. Thank you, Counsel. Prior 
to the death of LaMar D. Stevenson. 
A Was I ever advised? 
Q By anyone. 
A I would have had knowledge through conversation 
with Denver. 
Q Did you have any specific knowledge in talking to 
either Mr. or Mrs. Stevenson about that? 
A No. That would have been handled in Denver. 
Q Do you know what "submit case to First Colony 
One" is? Is First Colony One a different insurance company 
than First Colony? 
A I would guess. A lot of companies have more than 
69 
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is written that says we are not going to insure this man. 
A That would go through our Denver office. 
Q Have you ever seen anything? 
MR. CHRISTIAN: His question is have you ever 
seen such a document. 
A No. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: We understand we have the 
complete Denver file, but I can't swear to that either. 
Q (by Mr. Young) I show you what has been marked 
as Deposition Exhibit Number 19. You received a copy of 
that letter after Mr. Stevenson's death? 
A Yes, I would have. 
Q And it says that she typed the sequence of 
events, and I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 23 
and ask you if that would have been the attachment to that 
letter? 
A It would have been. 
Q So you have had that in your file since November? 
A That would be correct. 
Q Did you, meaning Roger Fleiss, ever contact LaMar 
Stevenson or Maurine Stevenson and say that First Colony had 
rejected the application for insurance in any way? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if anyone did? 
A No. 
104 
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Talbert corporation 
"Y BONOS ANO INSURANCE 
:R COLORAOO 
D JUNCTION. COLORAOO 
.R. WYOMING 
JME CITY, UTAH 
Noverrber 21, 1986 
Mr. Boger Fleiss 
The Talbert Corporation of Utah 
205 West 700 South 
Salt Lake Utah 84101 
Dear Roger: 
Enclosed in this envelope are copies of First Colony and Bankers 
Life applications, underwriting requirements submitted to the 
conpanies, and notes from our files for the insured Lamar Stevenson* 
After reviewing the file, I typed a sequence of events and nave 
enclosed a copy of this for your records. Should you have any 
questions or need further information please give us a call. 
Thank you* 
Yours very truly, 
Christine Fresquez 
Account Assistant/Nontan R. Close 
Enclosure 
? 6 . ImJj^ rrui typo's "Ok. ^JJl '] 
<lXto^f 
ORDER OF EVENTS CONTINUED 
7-14-86 Sent application and aviation questionnaire to 
client. 
7-21-86 Fecieved and forward application and aviation 
questionnaire to ccirpany, First Colony, witn k pren. 
7-30-86 First Colony requested alcohol questionnaire 
as underwriting requirement. 
8-4-36 Cindy/United Underwriters to contact First Colony 
as to "why" the alcohol questionnaire. 
Due to inspection report. 
8-7-86 Sent insured alcohol questionnaire. 
8-12-36 Cindv/lYiited Undar;/ritars has advised us First 
Colony cannot place coverage to financial miorraticr 
obtained from inspection report. However, First 
Colony will submit to reinsurer as First Colony 
One. (Universal Life product) 
8-13-86 Fecevied alcohol questionnaire frcm client. 
8-23-86 Sent Roger First Colony Life One illustration and Bar 
Life 1 YFT illustration. 
9-27-86 Per Nona send Lamar The Bankers Life application and 
aviation questionnaire. Bankers to use First 
Colony exam. Sent application and questionnaire to 
client. 
9-29^86 Per United Underwriters First Colony closed file 
9-26-86
 r refund of prenium submitted with applicatic-
within the next ten days. 
10-1-86 Submitted Eankers Life application and requirements 
to conpany. 
OF EVENTS 
1-13-86 dvised Roger lapse of Chubb Life America 
olicy. 
1-30-86 lient has sent premium in to Qiubb 1-17-86. 
bntacted Chubb , they have premium but need 
einstatement form. 
2-5-86 ent client reinstatement forms to be mailed 
Lirectly to conpany. 
3-20-86 lent client copy of reinstatement to have 
manswered questions corrpleted. 
4-8-86 deceived form fron client 
4-25-86 advised conpany of info* but icotpany requires 
late client was in the hospital* Contacted 
toger. Roger called back with date. Coroany 
closed. 
4-28-86 intact Chubb with date of hospital date. 
5-1-86 Reinstatement in process per Chubb. 
5-9-86 Efecieved notice of cancel of reinstatement from 
Zhubb due to time delay of info, and form too 
Did to use. Can reopen reinstatement with 
three h premiums and new form. Advised Foger. 
5^19^6 Contact Chubb to get exact amount due or min prem. 
Darlene A. to call back with info. Need $1,147.4< 
5-28-86 Sent client other conpany illustrations 
cc; to Boger 
6-10«r36 Sent Boger First Colony applicatio, Lamar 
had advised Poger this is the product they want 
to go with, for a face amount of $500,000. 
7-1-86 Had client examed 
"fcXHlBrt 
Tab 6 
1. Fr;nt fuii name of Ffopcsed Insured 
• Single Quarried Q Widowed Q Divorced Q Separated 
2. Home address City 
\S>** »• «Cokd 
£0 
Mo.! Day' Yr. 
I Age State of 
i 1 Birth 
SCC. S-rC 
m /3 l39lV7> 7^ A k b l ^ j j j j ; ^ 
State Zip Years lived tr-
J7_ 
County 
3. Premium notices t o Q Proposed* Insured at home Q Proposed Insured at business • Owner at address ir 
4o Q Disability Income plan desired. Complete questions 1-8, 18-40 and D.I. Supplemental Application 
5* Disability Income in force (group, state, union, salary , 
continuation or individual)? Q Yes Q No ] 
Type of Company or 
Source ^Coverage 
AmtJ Benefit Elim. : 
Will policy applied for replace or change any c 
Disability Income insurance? Q Yes Q No 
Give details 
1 i 
9. LIFE plan desired 
(For AL show premium OR plan desired) 
Amount S £ <TOy G^O » 
/ wf + 
7. D.I. Dividends to Q Reduce prem. • Be paid in < 
I 8. D.I. mode Q Annual Q Semi-annual Q PJ 
j 12. Life mode 
• Annual 
"i Q Semi-annual 
1
 13. Life Insurance in fcrc 
Term rider 
FIR i 
_ _ for S. 
Mo. Inc. for _ 
^Company 
n Quarterly • PAC 
Q Monthly 
? _ D Yes _ Q No _ 
ADB -Yr. of fer< J Ufe 
!amount amount VVDB issue or bu 
yrSo 
term rider $_ Q WDB Q ADB: base amt $ 
Q PAPA Total ann. prem. (Divs. must be add'ns.) j -
• Change of Insured Q GPO/GIO $ 
••Spouse Term year benefit for S 
••Family OR Q Children Term for 
•'Payor Death or Disability ••Payor Death 
•Complete Spouse, Child, Payor Application 
1 1 _ J _ J ! 
1 T " I ~ f 1 
1 m i 
units 
j 14. Will policy applied for replace or chang^any other 
annuity insurance? • Yes Q>fo 
Give details - — ~ _ 
10. • APL 
11. Dividends to Q Reduce prem. Q Purchase add! insc 
• Accumulate at interest • Be paid in cash 
• EPO - Return CV* Q EPO - return of prem.* 
/Balance as checked 
• Improved policy - AL only 
Jf Proposed Insured is under age 15 complete: 
Apptreaqt (Parent, Guardian, etc.) 
ApplicantVAddress 
Applicant's relationship to 
Amt fife ins. on parent or guardia; 
Amount 0/ life ins. on other children S„ 
Is child in school? Q Yes • No Grade leve 
! 16. 
18. 
Answer 16 and 17jgn PROPOSED JNSURED if age 15 or older, otherwise on the Applicant (Parent, Guardiar 
a. Fr*ni*y*r Afh'tof f) ? \Sc/?s Years there [ 17. a. Occupation 
b. Type of business ' \ 
c. Address Qt*Q Mr/Jh n.nn f>)*zt 
fftr*/>9<*i*,i 
Owner 
Owner's Addf*?s$ 
Utah ficc,3 
b. Duties 
Annual Earned Income 
d. Any part time jobs? Duties 
19. 
Relationship to Proposed Insured 
Taxpayer ID Number 
Contingent Owner 
Unless stated above, owner, while living is (a) Proposed 
Insured if 2™ 15 or older or (b) Applicant if Proposed 
Insured is under age 15. This is Q Permanent or 
• Temporary to Q age 18 Q age 21 or Q ace 25. 
Exhib i t G 
Beneficiary and relationship to Proposed Insurer 
A A/Tin r 7$. V j f / f V M ^ ^ 7 7 V J A A ^ 
T«,s I Aon?J*M4 Oo T W Cf.j 
Contingent Beneficiary: 
• Proceeas to be left at interest. Eeneftcia/y 
election and withdrawal rights. 
Pay interest —— (free 
; DEPOSITION 
I EXHIBIT 
INSURANCE APPLICATION 
N2 306123 
Yes No 
Do you plan to live or travel (other than vacation) outside of the U.S.? 
Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, declined, modified or cancelled? , [>• 
Have you ever recuested or received ter.efits because of injury or sickness? , H 
Do ycu have an amplication for life or d:sao;!;ty income insurance pending in any company, or have you within the ; 
last tnree months aeoliec for such insurance? j n 
Have ycu. or do ycu plan to encage m hang kite cueing, scuca or sky aivmg, stock, modified, soons car, crac i 
strip, mctcrcvcle, motor boat, snowmcone or other tyce of racing? ; — p^ 
Do you plan to fly or have you, within the last five years flown as a pilot, student puot or crew memcer9 ' _ ^ _I 
Are you or do you intend to become a memser of a military service? • ~~ PP 
Crivers license number (c f**7 & ?& 
(a) 2 or more motor venicie moving violations or accidents? 
In the last 2 years have you been cnargea with: 
(b) driving while intoxicated? 
(c) suspension or revocation of your license? 
Have ycu in the last five years been arrested for other than traffic violations? 
Are you in a regular exercise program (jogging, swimming, etc.)? 
Any family history of heart or kidney oisease, high blood pressure or cancer? 
Within tne last 5 years have you: 
(a) been treated or counselled or joined an organization for alcohol or drug use? 
(b) used amohetamines, barbiturates, seaatives, LSD, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or morpnine, exceot as 
preserved by a doctor? 
"Yes" answers to 23, 34 and 35 reauire Soons, Aviation, Military Statement respectively. Explain or give reasons 
if "Yes" tor questions 29 - 32 and 36 - 40. 
•>1<~* 
/***<+> 
***V 
• ptASa-vJ" <xpi^, 
•esent that all statements in this application are true anc comoiete to the best of my knowleace and belief. 1 uncerstanc trey 
-e oasis c: any insurance issued. I agree that, exceot as the Conditional Receiot provides, the Comcany snail incur no :isc.:.:y 
ss ana UP.::!: (i) a oolicy is issued (2f the policy is received ana acceoted by the aoplicant and (3) the first cremium :s C2;c. 1 
e that these three concitions must occur wnile, as far as tne aoplicant knows, there has been no cnange since the pate c: this 
;n the health or any other factor affecting the insurability of any person proposed for insurance. 1 agree that only tne Heme 
e is authorized to pass on insuraoiiity or to make, change or discharge any contract or waive any of the Comcany s rents. I 
e tr.st the rent to cnange the beneficiary is reserved to the owner unless otherwise provided in question 19. Any cr.arce in 
>age, amount, ciass, plan or benefits maae by the Company shown under "Amendments'* is subject to my written ratification. 
:erstand the laws of the state listed below shall aopiy to any policy issued. 
h»s application is COD CR • I have paid S for Q Life Q Disability Income insurance. If money za.c 
e seen Given the Conditional Receipt in return. I have read it, and uncerstand and agree to its terms. 
Signature cf Accucant or Owner (if ether tnan 
Proposed Insured) If Owner is Corporation, 
Ct:;cer ctr.er than Proposed Insured snouid sign. 
Signature of Prcoosed Insure: 
(only if over age 9) 
